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[L. A. No. 21561.

In Bank.

Nov. 21, 1951.]

NEW YORK LIPE INSURANCE COMP.ANY, .Appellant, ·v.
LEO HOLLENDER, Respondent.
[1] Insurance- Incontestability Provisions.- The incontestable
clause of an insurance contract, after the lapse of time it
specifies, prevents nullification of the contract for any cause
not excepted by the clause.
[2] !d.-Incontestability Provisions.-Every resistance by an insurer against a claim of an insured or beneficiary is not a
contest of the policy within the meaning of an incontestable
clause, that is, a contest against the terms of the policy for
the purpose of destroying its validity as distinguished from
a contest for or in favor of the terms of the policy for the
purpose of securing its enforcement.
[3] !d.-Incontestability Provisions.-When an insurance policy
by its provisions is made incontestable after a specified period,
the intent of the parties is to fix a limited time within which
the insurer must discover and assert any grounds it may
have to justify a rescission of the contract. The insurer must
contest the policy within the prescribed period, either by the
institution of a suit to cancel the policy or by setting up misrepresentation or fraud in the procurement of the policy
as a defense to an action brought by the insured or beneficiary.
[4] Id.-Rescission.-An insured's understatement of his age is
not ground for rescission of an insurance policy under the
terms of which the insurer is expressly obligated to pay the
amount of insurance which the premiums paid would purchase
at the insured's correct age.
[5] !d.-Incontestability Provisions.-An incontestable clause in
a life insurance policy does not invalidate, or prevent enforcement of, an age adjustment clause or provision.
[6] !d.-Incontestability Provisions.-The distinction between a
contest of an insurance policy and a controversy as to the
policy coverage rests on the principle that where there has
been no assumption of risk, there can be no liability.
[1] See 29 Am.Jur. 681.
[5] Age adjustment clause of policy as affected by incontestable
clause, note, 135 A.L.R. 445.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 5, 6, 10] Insurance, § 54.1; [4] Insurance, § 110; [7] Insurance, §56; [8] Insurance, § 60; [9] Contracts, § 127; [11, 12] Insurance, §53.
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[7] !d.-Interpretation of Contract.---In construing life insurancP
policies, as in construing other contracts, the entire contract
is to be construed together for the purpose of giving force
and effect to each clause. ( Civ. Code, § 1641.)
[8] !d.-Interpretation of Contract.-In case of doubt, the provisions of an insurance contract will be construed most strongly
against the insurer; but where the terms of the policy are
plain and explicit, the court will indulge in no forced construction so as to cast a liability upon the insurance company
which it has not assumed.
[9] Contracts-Interpretation-Intention of Parties.-In the interpretation of any written instrument, the primary object is
to ascertain and carry out the intention of the parties. ( Civ.
Code, § 1636.)
[10] Insurance-Incontestability Provisions-Effect of Age Adjustment Clause.-The age adjustment clause in a life insurance contract does not conflict with the incontestable clause
but rather, as an independent provision of the insurance contract, it expresses the parties' agreement for the correction
of errors consistent with their rights and obligations during
the life of the policy.
[11] !d.-Reformation of Contract.-In an action to reform a life
insurance policy to reflect the true age of the insured for the
purpose of establishing the risk assumed under an age adjustment clause, the court errs in excluding admissions as to the
date of his birth made by the insured on documentary statements other than the insurance contract.
·
[12] !d.-Reformation of Contract.-In an action to reform a life
insurance policy to reflect the true age of the insured for the
purpose of establishing the risk assumed under an age adjustment clause, the principle of decision cannot be affected by
the fact that, if the insurer prevails in its proof on the age
issue, it will succeed in avoiding the payment of disability
benefits and the waiver of premiums provided in the policy.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
.Joseph Marchetti, Judge pro tem.*
Angeles County.
Reversed.
Action for reformation of an insurance contract. Judgment
for defendant reversed.
[7] See 14 Cal.Jur. 440; 29 Am.Jur. 171.
"Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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Meserve, Mumper & Hughes and C. Avery Crary for
Appellant.
Newlin, Holley, Sandmeyer & Tackabury, Keesling & Keesling, Henry H. Childress, George W. Tackabury and Hudson
B. Cox, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Appellant.
Leo M. Zinner, Walley & Davis and Milton Davis for Respondent.
SPENCE, J.-Plaintiff brought this action to reform an
insurance policy issued on the life of defendant Leo Hollender.
Specifically, it sought a reduction in the face amount of the
policy so as to conform with the alleged true age of the insured.
Defendant cross-complained for the amount of total and permanent disability payments allegedly due under the policy,
and for the refund of premiums allegedly paid to prevent
forfeiture of the policy. The trial court, sitting without a
jury, granted a motion for nonsuit on the complaint and
made findings in favor of the insured on the issues embraced
in the cross-complaint and the answer thereto. Judgment
in favor of defendant was entered accordingly and from such
judgment, plaintiff has appealed.
This case presents for determination the question of whether
the incontestable clause of the policy bars the right of plaintiff
to adjust the amount payable under the insurance contract
in accordance with the provisions of the age adjustment clause
thereof. The trial court adopted the theory of defendant
insured in holding that the reformation sought by plaintiff
constituted a contest of the policy after the time limitation
therefor had expired, and that plaintiff therefore was precluded from inquiry into the correctness of defendant's statement of age. In challenge of such view, plaintiff maintains
that it is not contesting the provisions of the policy but is
only seeking to confine its liability within the express terms
thereof-to enforce the insurance contract in accordance with
its coverage and the risk assumed-and that therefore the
incontestable clause does not apply in bar of its claim for
reformation. An analysis of the policy sustains the propriety
of plaintiff's argument, and we therefore conclude that the
judgment must be reversed.
On April 16, 1931, plaintiff issued a life insurance policy,
with provision for certain disability benefits, to defendant
Leo Hollender. In his application for such policy made on
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April 10, 1931, defendant stated that he was born in Russia
on April 27, 1886, and that his age as of his nearest birthday
was 45 years. The policy was in the face amount of $5,000,
and the disability payments were fixed at $50 per month,
with the proviso that defendant's total and permanent disability must have begun before the anniversary of the policy
on which his age at nearest birthday was 60 and prior to
the maturity of the contract, and in which event plaintiff
would then waive the payment of future premiums. The policy
contained these further pertinent provisions:
''Age. If the age of the insured has been misstated, the
amount payable hereunder shall be such as the premium paid
would have purchased at the correct age.
"The Contract. The Policy and the application therefor,
copy of which is attached hereto, constitute the entire contract.
''Incontestability. This Policy shall be incontestable after
two years from its date of issue except for non-payment of
premium and except as to the provisions and conditions relating to Disability and Double Indemnity Benefits.''
By stipulation of the parties, it is conceded that defendant
became totally and permanently disabled on June 15, 1945,
within the meaning of the policy, and that on December 16,
1945, defendant filed with plaintiff his proof and claim for
disability benefits, with demand for the scheduled $50 monthly
payments and the specified waiver of premiums. Upon investigation of defendant's claim and the conclusion that his
total and permanent disability did not occur within the prescribed age period, plaintiff refused defendant's demand. The
policy was not then in default and defendant continued to
make premium payments so as to avoid cancellation.
Plaintiff thereafter commenced this action for reformation
of the policy. It alleged that defendant was in fact born on
April 27, 1884, and it asked that the policy be reformed to
reflect that age qualification: by changing the face value of
the policy from $5,000 to $4,632 (the amount of insurance
which the premiums paid would have purchased at the corrected age, that is, 47 instead of 45 years at the time of
defendant's original application for the insurance). In answer
to plaintiff's complaint, defendant denied the alleged misstatement of age and claimed that he ''did not become sixty
years of age until April, 1946," which would accord with the
representation made at the time he applied for insurance with
plaintiff. Defendant then cross-complained for the payment
of disability payments, the refund of the premium allegedly
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paid to prevent cancellation of the policy, and the waiver of
the obligation to pay future premiums. At the trial plaintiff
attempted to introduce certain documentary evidence wherein
defendant had stated his birthdate as April, 1884. Such
documentary evidence included his declaration of intention
to become a citizen of the United States made in 1910, his
petition for naturalization in 1914, and his World War I
draft registration in 1918. Defendant's objection to this evidence-offered by plaintiff in support of its claim for reformation of the policy and its contention that defendant's total
and permanent disability occurred subsequently to the anniversary of the policy nearest his sixtieth birthday-was sustained on the ground that the incontestable clause of the
policy barred plaintiff from disputing defendant's statement
of age as made in his insurance application. In line with
such ruling, the trial court found that ''at the time of commencement of . . . disability, defendant's . . . age at nearest birthday was fifty-nine years," and that he was entitled
to recovery on his cross-complaint. Defendant's age was
properly an issue for determination by the court as a matter
of fact, and plaintiff's proffered evidence thereon was improperly excluded.
[1] It is generally held that the incontestable clause, after
the lapse of time it specifies, prevents nullification of the
insurance contract for any cause not excepted in the clause.
(29 Am.Jur. p. 674, § 881; 45 C.J.S. p. 758, § 747a; 1 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, ch. 17, p. 383, § 331;
111etropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Shalloway (C.C.A. 5th), 151
F.2d 548, 550; Dibble v. Rel1:ance Life Ins. Co., 170 Cal. 199,
208 [149 P. 171, Ann.Cas. 1917E 34]; Goodley v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 9 Cal.2d 269, 272 [70 P.2d 602] .) However,
here plaintiff's effort is not to nullify the insurance contract,
but recognizing its validity, to have it enforced according to
its terms. [:2] Every resistance by the insurer against a
claim of the insured or the beneficiary is in one sense a contest,
but it is not a contest of the policy within the meaning of the
"incontestable clause," that is, a contest against the terms of
the policy for the purpose of destroying its validity as distinguished from a contest for or in favor of the terms of the
policy for the purpose of securing its enforcement. (Moore v.
Bankers' Credit Life Ins. Co., 223 Ala. 373 [136 So. 798, 799];
Langan v. United States Life Ins. Co., 344 Mo. 989 [130 S.W.2d
479, 481, 123 A.L.R. 1409]; Hall v. 111issouTi Ins. Co. (Mo.
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App.), 208 S.W.2d 830, 833; StAan v. Occidental Life In.~. Co.,
24 N.M. 346 l171 P. 786, 787].)
[3] When an insurance policy by its provisions is made
incontestable after a specified period, the intent of the parties
is to fix a limited time within which the insurer must discover
and assert any grounds it might have to justify a rescission
of the contract. Accordingly, the insurer must make its
"contest of the policy" within the prescribed period, either
by the institution of a suit to cancel the policy or by setting
up misrepresentation or fraud in the procurement of the
policy as a defense in an action brought by the insured or
the beneficiary. [4] But the present case is not within the
concept of such litigation. Rather here, defendant's alleged
understatement of his age was not, under the terms of the
policy, ground for its rescission by plaintiff, for the policy
expressly obligated plaintiff to pay the amount of insurance
which the premiums paid would have purchased at defendant's "correct age." ( 1 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice, ch. 10, p. 187, § 193; Singleton v. Prudentia.l Ins. Co.,
11 App.Div. 403 [42 N.Y.S. 446, 448]; Zolintakis v. Equitable Life Assttr. Soc. (C.C.A. lOth), 97 F.2d 583, 586.)
A policy provision which measures the amount of recovery
does not avoid the obligation of the policy. On the contrary,
it gives the insured what his money bought at his correct age.
The denial of liability under a policy by reason of fraud or
misrepresentation in its procurement is the "contest" which
is governed by the incontestable clause (Annos. 6 A.L.R. 452,
13 A.L.R. 675, 35 A.L.R. 1492, 170 A.L.R. 1048; Goodley v.
New York Life Ins. Co., st[pra, 9 Cal.2d 269, 272-274; mair v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 40 Cal.App.2d 494, 501 [104 P.2d
1075]; Brat[n v. New York Life Ins. Co., 46 Cal.App.2d 335,
346 [115 P.2d 880] ; Trot[sdell v. Eqttitable Life Assur. Soc.,
55 Cal.App. 2d 74, 78-81 [130 P.2d 173]), and not the raising
of the question of coverage afforded by the policy under
application of the age adjustment clause.
It appears that this precise problem has not heretofore been
the subject of judicial review in this state. [5] However,
the matter apparently has been adjudicated in a number of
other jurisdictions, and while there is some conflict of judicial
opinion, the weight of authority clearly favors the view that
an incontestable clause in a life insurance policy does not
invalidate, or prevent enforcement of, an age adjustment
clause or provision. ( 45 C.J.S. p. 770, § 751b; annos. 123
A.L.R. 1416 and 135 A.L.R. 446.) As said by Chief Justice
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Cardozo in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 252 N.Y.
449 [169 N.E. 642], an incontestable clause "is not a mandate
as to coverage, a definition of the hazards to be borne by the
insurer. It means only this, that within the limits of the
coverage, the policy shall stand, unaffected by any defense
that it was invalid in its inception, or thereafter became invalid by reason of a condition broken." (Italics added; see,
also, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Shalloway (C.C.A. 5th),
supra, 151 F.2d 548, 551; Messina v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
173 Miss. 378 [161 So. 462, 463]; New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Yeit, 294 N.Y. 222 [62 N.E.2d 45, 46].)
In Murphy v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 134 Misc. 238 [234
N.Y.S. 278], a similar question arose as to the right of
the insurance company to litigate the matter of the insured's
age in the face of an incontestable clause in the policy. The
insured took out the policy upon the representation that his
age was 45 years when it was in fact 50. Upon his death following the expiration of the incontestable period, the insurance company paid the reduced amount in accordance with
the terms of the age adjustment clause in the policy, and the
beneficiary sued for the difference. In holding that the company's resistance to payment of the full amount of insurance
was not a ''contest'' of the policy within the prohibition of
the incontestable clause, the court said at page 280 [234
N.Y.S.] : "When the insured . . . applied for life insurance,
no matter what age he may have stated in his application, he
knew that he was entitled to no more than the amount which
he could purchase for the stipulated premium at his true age.
This was clearly what the [company] intended when it issued
its policy. Can it be logically said that the [company] intended that this intent expressed in the contract should prevail for only one year [the prescribed incontestable period]?
I do not think so. A contrary conclusion would of necessity
involve an intentional injustice on the part of the [company]
to every policy holder paying premiums predicated upon true
age. This, it seems to me, was never contemplated.
''The claim that [the company] is contesting a contract
contrary to its provisions is not well founded. The case might
better be stated in this fashion: The [beneficiary] is attempting to enforce a contract which was never made, is seeking to
obtain something which was never paid for, is striving to employ that which was designed for her protection as an instrument of injustice to the [company] and all its policy holders.''
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To like effect see Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. First Nat. Bank,
(C.C.A. 5th) 113 F.2d 272, 274 [135 A.L.R. 439]; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Shalloway, (C.C.A. 5th) supra, 151 F.2d
548, 550-552; Ginsberg v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 240
Ala. 299 [198 So. 855, 858-859]; Messina v. New York Life
Ins. Co., sttpra, 173 Miss. 378 [161 So. 462, 463-464] ; Langan
v. United States Life Ins. Co., supra, 344 Mo. 989 [130 S.W.2d
479, 481-483, 123 A.L.R. 1409]; Hall v. Missouri Ins. Co.,
supra (Mo.App.) 208 S.W.2d 830, 832-833; Stean v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., supra, 24 N.M. 346 [171 P. 786, 787];
Unterberg v. New York Life Ins. Co., 172 N.Y.S. 241, 242;
Grenis v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 154 Misc. 867
[278 N.Y.S. 137, 138]; Sipp v. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co.,
293 Pa. 292 [142 A. 221, 222] ; Home Life Ins. Co. of America v. Greenspan, 360 Pa. 542 [63 A.2d 72, 75] .)
While, as heretofore indicated, there is some authority in
support of defendant's view that the incontestable clause precludes enforcement of the age adjustment clause after the
expiration of the specified period for "contest" of the policy,
notably Muhtal Life Ins. Co. v. New, 125 La. 41 [51 So. 61,
136 Am.St.Rep. 326, 27 L.R.A.N.S. 431], Arnold v. Equitable
Life Assur. Soc., (D.C.) 228 F. 157, and Lincoln Health &
Ace. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 175 Okla. 211 [52 P.2d 793], these cases
have been respectively distinguished and criticized as unsound
in Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. First Nat. Bank, (C.C.A. 5th)
supra, 113 F.2d 272, 274-275, and Langan v. United States
Life Ins. Co., supra, 344 Mo. 989 [130 S.W.2d 479, 482, 123
A.L.R. 1409].
The incontestable clause and the one fixing the terms of liability in case of misstatement of age are not inconsistent;
there is no conflict between the two, but rather they both
stand, one independent of the other. The like question has
been the subject of discussion when there appeared a stipulation against liability in case of suicide (Moore v. Bankers'
Credit Life Ins. Co., s1tpra, 223 Ala. 373 [136 So. 798, 799] ;
Myers v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 124 Kan. 191 [257 P. 933, 935,
55 A.L.R. 542] ; Stean v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., supra, 24
N.M. 346 [171 P. 786, 787] ; Scales v. Jefferson Standard
Life Ins. Co., 155 Tenn. 412 [295 S.W. 58, 59, 55 A.L.R. 537] ),
a contingency provision governing the payment of double
indemnity (Sanders v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co.,
(C.C.A. 5th) 10 F.2d 143, 144), a limitation dependent upon
the cause of death (Darden v. North American Ben. Assn.,
170 Va. 479 [197 S.E. 413, 415] ), or a restriction relieving

Nov.1951]

NEw YoRK LmE INs. Co. v. HoLIJENDER

81

[38 C.2d 73; 237 P.2d 510]

from responsibility to pay disability benefits (Cohen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 32 Cal.App.2d 337, 346 [89 P.2d 732] ;
Fohl v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 54 Cal.App.2d 368, 377
[129 P.2d 24]). In all such instances the provisions, as part
of the parties' agreement, have been enforced, notwithstanding the insertion of a stipulation limiting the right of contest.
[6] Such distinction of a "contest of the policy" from a
controversy as to policy coverage simply rests on the wellrecognized principle that "where there has been no assumption
of the risk, there can be no liability." (Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Conway, st~pra, 252 N.Y. 449 [169 N.E. 642, 643] ; see,
also, Equitable Life Ass~tr. Soc. v. First Nat. Bank, (C.C.A.
5th) supra, 113 F.2d 272, 276; Cohen v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., supra, 32 Cal.App.2d 337, 346.)
[7] In construing life insurance policies as in the construction of other contracts, the entire contract is to be construed
together for the purpose of giving force and effect to each
clause. ( 44 C.J.S. p. 1136, § 289; p. 1196, § 298; Civ. Code,
§ 1641; Ogburn v. Travelers Ins. Co., 207 Cal. 50, 52-53 [276 P.
1004]; Security Tntst & Sav. Bank v. New York Indem. Co.,
220 Cal. 372, 377 [31 P.2d 365].) [8] While it is settled
law that in case of doubt the provisions of the insurance contract will be construed most strongly against the insurer
( 44 C.J.S. p. 1166, § 297 c (1) ; Fageol Trtwk & Coach Co. v.
Pacific Indern. Co., 18 Cal.2d 731, 747 [117 P.2d 661]; M1Itual
Life Ins. Co. v. Mm·gol1:s, 11 Cal.App.2d 382, 387-388 [53 P.
2d 1017]), the rule is equally well established that where the
terms of the policy are plain and explicit, the court will indulge
in no forced construction so as to cast a liability upon the
insurance company which it has not assumed ( 44 C.J.S.
p. 1190, § 297c(2); Burr v. Western States Life Ins. Co., 211
Cal. 568, 576 [296 P. 273]). [9] In the interpretation of
any written instrument, the primary object is to ascertain and
carry out the intention of the parties. ( 44 C.J.S. p. 1146,
§ 291; Civ. Code, § 1636; Ogburn v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra,
207 Cal. 50, 52.) So here, the age adjustment clause is clear
and explicit in its measure of the liability assumed by plaintiff; it goes directly to the risk expressed in the terms of the
policy according to the ''correct age'' of the insured. As
such qualification on the coverage intended by the policy, it is
not affected by the time limitation prescribed in the incontestable clause, at the end of which period plaintiff was bound
to the full extent of the risk it had assumed but it was not
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liable on a risk it had stipulated it would not assume-coverage that was not premised on defendant's ''correct age.'' To
hold otherwise and to the effect that the incontestable clause
nullified the provision of the age adjustment clause would do
violence to the clear intention of the parties plainly and unambiguously expressed. (Meh·opolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Shalloway, (C.C.A. 5th) supra, 151 F.2d 548, 551-552; Ginsberg
v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., supra, 240 Ala. 299 [198 So.
855, 858] ; Murphy v. Travelers' Ins. Co., s~tpra, 134 Misc.
238 [234 N.Y.S. 278, 280] .)
The ''correct age of insurants is the chief corner-stone of
the life insurance structure" (Langan v. United States Life
Ins. Co., supra, 344 Mo. 988 [130 S.W.2d 479, 483, 123 A.L.R.
1409] ), with rates "based on mortality tables, worked out by
actuaries'' and premiums adjusted according to ''life expectancy" experience (Ginsberg v. Union Central Life Ins. Co.,
supra, 240 Ala. 299 [198 So. 855, 858]). In accord with such
basic principle affecting the bargaining premise of the parties
in their insurance contract, the age adjustment clause is included in the policy. (58 C.J.S. pp. 1210-1211.) The clear
import of such clause is the agreement that any understatement
of age, whether intentional or not, shall not be relied upon as
a misrepresentation avoiding the policy within the purport
of the incontestable clause but rather, in such event of misstatement, the full amount payable under the policy shall be
the sum which the premiums paid would have purchased at
the correct age. This is manifestly fair to both parties in
effecting the "correct age" adjustment, whether the benefit
redound to the insurer because of an understatement or to the
insured because of an overstatement. It would be untenable to
hold that the age adjustment clause should have effect only
during the contest period prescribed by the policy as required
by statute, and then become innocuous, for then the comprehensive age balance constituting the "corner-stone of the life
insurance structure'' would be completely distorted through
conferring ''all the benefits of the age adjustment clause on the
insured'' by inviting him to ''understate his age, get by with
it until the time for adjustment had l)assed, and thereupon become secure in the advantage he had so gained." (Ginsberg v.
Union Central Life Ins. Co., supra, 240 Ala. 299 [198 So. 855,
858] .) It must be remembered that ordinarily the age of the
applicant for insurance does not affect the acceptability of
the risk, and admittedly plaintiff would have issued the policy
as readily to defendant at age 47 as at age 45 years, with the
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age factor simply operating to fix the insurance premiums
according to the established mortality tables. [10] Accordingly, the age adjustment clause cannot be held to conflict
with the incontestable clause but rather, as an independent
provision of the insurance contract, it expresses the parties'
agreement for the correction of errors consistent with their
rights and obligations during the life of the policy. (Langan
v. United States Life Ins. Co., supra, 344 Mo. 988 [130 S.W.2d
479, 481-483, 123 A.L.R. 1409] .)
In further objection to plaintiff's right to relief here, defendant cites the case of Richardson v. Travelers Ins. Co.,
(C.C.A. 9th) 171 F.2d 699, for its holding that reformation
of an insurance policy on the ground of mistake is barred after
the expiration of the prescribed period in the incontestable
clause. That case involved the attempt of the insurance company to reform the policy to express the true agreement of the
parties, and such relief was denied. Whether or not the
Richardson case was correctly decided (cf. notes, 62 Harv.L.
Rev. 890; 97 Univ. of Pa.L.Rev. 741), it is nevertheless clearly
distinguishable.
In the Richardson case it appears that through a mistake
of the insurance company a pension policy was issued to the
insured instead of a life insurance policy on a so-called "Uniform Premium Plan,'' there being a considerable difference
in the benefits and the amount of premiums between the types
of policies. Twenty years later the company sought to rectify
the mistake through reformation of the policy, and the court
held that in the face of the one-year incontestable clause, the
company's action was tantamount to a contest of the terms of
the policy itself and could not be maintained. But there the
company was seeking to vary the express terms of the parties'
written contract and to substitute therefor a policy containing
entirely different provisions. Upon citation of Dibble v. Reliance Life Ins. Co., sttpra, 170 Cal. 199, where the incontestable
clause was applied in limitation of the insurance company's
right to cancel a policy because of alleged fraudulent representations by the insured, the court in the Richardson case
designated the mistake of the insurance company to be, like
fraud, an "inception defense," which must be litigated within
the stated period of the incontestable clause.
The situation here is quite different in that plaintiff is seeking a reformation of the policy in accordance with the express
terms of the age adjustment clause thereof, an enforcement of
the provisions of the parties' insurance contract rather than
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a variance therefrom. As so distinguished, the Richardson
case may properly be limited as a decision holding that in the
absence of any other pertinent contractual provision, the incontestable clause bars the insurance company from setting up
mistake as a ground for reformation after lapse of the contestable period. While it is true that the mistake as to defendant's age arose at the inception of the policy and was then subject to correction, it does not appear reasonable to conclude
that when the parties' contract expressly provided for an adjustment to rectify such inaccuracy, plaintiff nevertheless had
the burden of making discovery of such error and was bound
to litigate that misstatement within the two-year contestable
period or be foreclosed from having the correction of defendant's age square with the fact. Rather, it would seem, as said
in Gr·enis v. Prudential Ins. Co., supra, 154 Misc. 867 [278
N.Y.S. 137], at page 138 [278 N.Y.S.], "the consequences
of the discovery of the true age of the insured are operative
without relation to time. No matter when the discovery is
made, the benefits would be adjusted accordingly . . . . [The
correction] does not destroy but harmonizes with the intent
and spirit of the incontestability provision that the adjustment
of the benefits be regulated according to age, whenever the
age is revealed, even though the revelation be subsequent to
the [contestable period]." Under the circumstances, the ordinary rules of equity sustain plaintiff's right to a reformation
of the policy to accord with "the contract of insurance providing the method of the fair and honest adjustment of the
rights of the parties." (Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Trilling,
194 App.Div. 178 [184 N.Y.S. 898, 902] ; see 44 C.J.S. p.
1108, § 278; Ginsberg v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., supra,
240 Ala. 299 [198 So. 855, 859], and cases there cited.)
Before leaving this portion o£ the discussion, it may be well
to state that as plaintiff was relying upon the terms of the
contract as written, an action for declaratory relief (Code
Civ. Proc., § 1060) would have afforded an equally appropriate remedy to determine the rights and duties of the parties
thereunder. While the remedy of reformation was properly
invoked, the point which should be stressed is that the nature
of the reformation which plaintiff sought, unlike that sought
in the Richardson case and in certain other cited cases, was
entirely in line with the agreement of the parties as expressed
within the four corners of their written contract.
[11] Defendant finally contends that since the parties
agreed that the "policy and the application therefor . . . con-
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stitute the entire contract'' and that ''this policy shall be incontestable,'' plaintiff may not controvert defendant's age
statement by resort to evidence outside the express provisions
of their insurance contract. This argument is untenable as
applied to plaintiff's right to adjust the terms of its coverage
according to the risk assumed. As said in Cohen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra, 32 Cal.App.2d 337, at page 346:
''An incontestable clause in an insurance policy does not extend the coverage beyond the terms of the policy." Thus in
the Cohen case, as in John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Markowitz, 62 Cal.App.2d 388 [144 P.2d 899], the incontestable clause of the policy did not foreclose the insurance company from introducing evidence in dispute of the insured's
statements on his insurance application and to show the insured's claim for disability benefits was without the terms of
the company's agreed coverage in that the disability had occurred prior to the effective date of the policy. (See, also,
Fohl v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra, 54 Cal.App.2d 368,
377.) So in the present case, in determining a question of
insurance coverage, the matter of defendant's "correct age"
would be ''open to investigation during the life of the policy,
and if a misstatement as to it is discovered it [would] not avoid
the policy, but 'any amount payable under it' . . . [must]
be adjusted to the true age" (Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
ShaUoway, (C.C.A. 5th) sttpra, 151 F.2d 548, 551-552); and
material to the determination of that issue would be ''definite
statements or declarations of the person whose age is in question, n:ade by him during his lifetime on solemn occasions when
it was his bounden dnty to speak the truth, and when there
was no motive or occasion, actual or supposed, on his part to
speak other than the truth" (Messina v. New York Life Ins.
Co., suprn, 173 Miss. 378 r161 So. 462, 464]; see, also, Langan
v. Un1:ted States L1:fe Ins. Co., sttpra, 344 Mo. 989 [130 S.W.
2d 479, 483, 123 A.L.R. 1409]: Sipp v. Phaadelphia Life Ins.
Ins. Co., S11pra, 293 Pa. 292 r142 A. 221, 223-224] ; Home Life
Ins. Co. of America v. GTeenspan, snpra, 360 Pa. 542 [63 A.2i!
72, 741). Accordingly, it follows that the trial court here
erred in excluding admissions made by defendant on other
rlocumentary statements as to the date of birth. Since the
right to recover moneys paid by an insurance company under
a mistake as to the policy coverage, and in reliance upon the
insured's representations in his application, has been recognized in this state as without the scope of the incontestable
clause (Cohen v. JJ1etropoUtan Life Ins. Co., supra, 32 CaL
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App.2d 337, 346-347; John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Markowitz, supra, 62 Cal.App.2d 388, 397-398), plaintiff properly invokes the same reasoning as applicable in support of its
action for reformation of the policy here involved to preclude
the payment of moneys which would be subject to recovery if
later discovered to have been paid under a mistake as to coverage liability.
[12] Defendant argues that if plaintiff prevails in its proof
on the age issue, it will succeed in avoiding the disability benefits and the waiver of premiums provided in the policy. But
that was a condition of the policy coverage to which the parties specifically agreed, and the principle of decision cannot
be affected by "hardships, advantages or disadvantages which
may result from . . . a construction" of the insurance contract according to the parties' intent plainly and unambiguously expressed. ( Ogb~trn v. Travelers Ins. Co., supra, 207
Cal. 50, 52; also B~trr v. Western States Life Ins. Co., supra,
211 Cal. 568, 576.) So pertinent is Chief Justice Cardozo's
observation in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, supra,
252 N.Y. 449 [169 N.E. 642], at page 643 [169 N.E.] : "A
provision for incontestability does not have the effect of converting a promise to pay on the happening of a stated contingency into a promise to pay whether such contingency does
or does not happen." (Also Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v.
Rothstein, 122 N.J.Ch. 606 [195 A. 723, 724) .)
The judgment is reversed.
Gibson, C. J., Traynor, J., White, J. pro tern., and Wood
(Parker), J. pro tern., concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The decision reached here by the majority of this court is
another instance where lip-service is paid to a salutary rule
by recognizing its existence only to find that under the facts
presented it has no application. The rule to which I refer
is the old and just one-that a contract of insurance shall be
construed most strictly against the insurer.
The incontestability clause in the policy under consideration here provided that ''This Policy shall be incontestable
after two years from its date of issue except for non-payment
of premium and except as to the provisions and conditions relating to disability and Double Indemnity Benefits." In
spite of the fact that none of the three exceptions is involved
here, the majority of this court cites many authorities in sup-
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port of the following statement: ''It is generally held that
the incontestable clause, after the lapse of time it specifies,
prevents nullification of the insurance contract for any cause
not excepted in the cla~(Se." Of course, it is explained that
what we have here is not a nullification of the contract, and
not a contest, but only an effort to have the policy enforced
according to its terms. This explanation is achieved by holding that the age adjustment clause if the age of the insured
has been misstated, the amount payable hereunder shall be
such as the premium paid would have purchased at the correct
age) is not within the scope of the incontestable clause.
To hold that the insurer here is not contesting the policy
is to play with words. The insurer is resisting payment of
part of the face value of the policy despite the fact that it is
claimed that it seeks only to enforce it according to its value
as reformed. No matter what the insurer claims, this action
destroys the validity of the policy in part. In Arnold v. Equitable Life Assttr. Soc. of U. S., 228 F. 157, the court said that
under the terms of the policy no one would contend that the
defendant could make an absolute defense upon the ground of
misrepresentation as to age, so if it could not make a defense
to the whole policy, how could it make a defense to it in part?
And yet the defendant there, as here, denied liability for the
face value but admitted liability for a smaller sum, the denial
being based upon misrepresentation in the application for
insurance. The court concluded that the partial defense pleaded
could not be sustained.
An incontestable clause in an insurance policy is intended
to free the beneficiary from delay, annoyance and expense in
acquiring the amount which had been carefully provided.
Premiums on life insurance policies are often paid at a great
sacrifice, and one of the most disturbing and unsatisfactory
features of the insurance contract is the fact that, after these
sacrifices and payments have been made for a number of
years, and the insured has died, so that his testimony and
perhaps that of others has been rendered unavailable by the
lapse of time and the occurrence of death, instead of receiving
the promised reward, the beneficiary will be met with a contest
and a lawsuit to determine whether the insurance ever had
any validity or force. Hence it has become an almost universal practice with insurance companies to provide against any
contest or forfeiture of their policies after a certain length
of time, greater in some cases and less in others (Clement v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 101 Tenn. 22 [46 S.W. 561, 70 Am.St.
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Rep. 650,42 L.R.A. 247] .) As was said in Humpston v. State
Mut. Life Assur. Co., 148 Tenn. 439, 441, 467 [256 S.W. 438,
31 A.L.R. 78] : '"l'he incontestable clause in the policies sued
on was written into them by the defendant [insurance company] itself. It was contractual, and the effect of it was to
prevent the insurer from interposing as a defense the falsity
of the representations of the insured, which might be fraudulent. In other words, defendant said to the insured : 'I will
take one year in which to ascertain whether your representations are false, and whether you have been guilty of any fraud
in obtaining the contract and, if within that period, I do not
ascertain or discover such falsity and fraud, I agree to make
no further inquiry into these matters, and make no defense
on account of them.' " It is my belief that this is a correct
analysis of the purpose of the incontestable clause in a policy
of insurance. It is most definitely within the power of the
insurer to include any exceptions it wishes to make within the
cla'use itself, or specifically to refer to other clauses which it
would make a part of the incontestable clause.
We are told here that when an insurance policy by its provisions is made incontestable after a specified period, as this
one was, that the intent of the parties is to fix a limited time
within which the insurer must discover and assert any grounds
it might have to justify a rescission of the contract; that accordingly, the insurer must make its ''contest of the policy''
within the prescribed period, either by the institution of a
suit to cancel the policy or by setting up misrepresentation
or fraud in the procurement of the policy as a defense in an
action brought by the insured or the beneficiary. As I have
pointed out, the present action is a ''contest'' as to part of
the policy whether or not it is actually called that.
We are also told that the correct age of insurants is the
chief cornerstone of the life insurance structure but that "it
does not appear reasonable to conclude that when the parties'
contract expressly provided for an adjustment to rectify such
inaccuracy, plaintiff nevertheless had the burden of making
discovery of such error and was bound to litigate that misstatement within the two-year contestable period or be foreclosed
from having the eorrection of defendant's age square with the
fact.'' To my mind, if the eorrect age of the applicant is of
such vital importance to life insurance companies, it would
appear to be mueh more reasonable to require the insurers
to discover any such errors than to hold that the incontestable
clause does not apply.
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It would be as simple, and far more just, for this court to
hold that the clause providing for adjustment when a misstatement of age has occurred, prevents rescission of the entire
contract, provides for reformation so that the amount payable shall correspond to that which the premium paid would
have purchased at the correct age, and that this reformation
must take place within the time limited in the clause preventing
a contest after the two-year period. In so doing, effect would
be given to both the incontestable clause and the misstatement
of age clause because both are general clauses, neither controlling the other. Thus both general clauses are construed
together and effect given to both. In Lincoln Health & Ace.
Ins. Co. v. Jones, 175 Okla. 211 [52 P.2d 793], the court
pointed out that the company had, in such a situation, ample
time to make inquiry about the age of the insured within the
two years after the date of the policy. That if the insured
understated his age, the company might have readjusted the
policy on the basis of true age, but after two years had elapsed
defenses are no longer available unless the grounds are excepted by the ter·ms of the policy. It was concluded that the
misstatement of age provision can only be taken advantage of
by the insurance company during the two-year period provided
for by the incontestable clause. (See, also, Mut1wl Life Ins.
Co. of New York v. New, 125 La. 41 [51 So. 61, 136 Am.St.
Rep. 326, 27 L.R.A. 431]; Mitchell v. Pennsylvania M1d. Life,
90 Pa.Super. 426; Arnold v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S.,
supra, 228 F. 157.)
If the foregoing construction is placed upon the policy here
involved, the contract of insurance will be construed most
strongly against the insurer, as it should be.
I would affirm the judgment.

SCHAUER, J.-I concur in the conclusion reached by Justice Carter.
The argument that in this case the incontestable clause
should not be operative because it would work an injustice
on other insureds goes too far. On that reasoning the incontestable clause could be held utterly meaningless in any case
of misrepresentation or innocent mistake as to a material
matter of fact.
It seems incongruous to me to recognize the express declarations of the policy that the ''policy and the application therefor [in which the insured's age is stated] . . . constitute the
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entire contract"; that "This policy shall be incontestable
after two years from the date of its issue except for non-payment of premium and except as to the provisions and conditions relating to Disability and Double Indemnity Benefits'' ;
and then to hold that "the matter of defendant's 'correct age'
would be 'open to investigation during the life of the policy'."
The exceptions to the incontestable clause above quoted are
specific; they do not include misstatement of age.
The majority, as I understand their opinion, avoid giving
effect to the two-year contest limitation in the incontestable
clause by holding that this action to reform the policy is
not a contest of liability under it. Yet these facts are unescapable: (1) On the face of the contract and the facts established, accepting the age statement as true, the insurer
is liable to pay $50 a month to the insured, commencing October 15, 1945, and to waive premiums falling due under the
policy from and after June 15, 1945. On the date of trial
the amount prima facie due to the insured was $2,400 in disability payments plus $875.60 in premiums paid under protest, a total of $3,275.60. (2) The insurer refuses to pay any
part of this sum except that it would refund what it claims
are overpayments of premiums made since April 10, 1944,
which date it alleges is ''the anniversary of said policy on
which the insured's nearest birthday was sixty." (3) The
insurer asks that ''said policy of insurance . . . be reformed
by changing the face amount thereof [from $5,000] to $4,632
and by reducing the semi-annual premiums . . . payable under
said policy . . . from and after April 10, 1944" and that
''the application of . . . [the insured J . . . be reformed by
changing the date of birth of said insured from April, 1886 to
April, 1884." ( 4) The payment of disability benefits and the
waiver of premium are conditioned on disability occurring before age 60; under the facts here alleged by the insurer, if the
policy and application are reformed as sought by it, it will
avoid entirely the payment of such benefits and the waiver of
premiums. ( 5) The insured was born in Russia and there is
no showing that the exact date of his birth was recorded or
can be proved with certainty. The policy was applied for on
April 10, 1931; it was issued on April 16, 1931; this suit for
reformation was filed December 11, 1946. It is reasonable to
believe that it would have been easier for the insured to find
and produce evidence as to the date of his birth within two
years from the time the policy was issued than after the lapse
of more than 15 years. Hence the recital in the policy (which
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includes the application) of the date of birth is a matter as
to which the contest limitation period of two years is reasonable and appropriate.
It seems to me that the relief sought by the insurer, under
the circumstances shown, amounts to a contest of its policy;
certainly it is a contest of the insured's claim under the policy
and his claim finds prima facie support in the policy and attached application. It is only by showing misrepresentation or
mistake as to the insured's age that his claim is sought to be
avoided. Since misrepresentation or mistake as to age is not
listed as an exception to the limitation on contestability after
two years, I think the trial judge was justified in the conclusions he reached. At most there is ambiguity in the policy
which ambiguity, of course, was created by the insurer. As·
indicated above, it well may be difficult for the insured at this
late date, particularly since he was born in a foreign country,
to prove the exact date of his birth.
For the reasons stated I would resolve the ambiguity against
the insurer and affirm the judgment.
The opinion was modified to read as above printed and
respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied December
20, 1951. Carter, J., and Schauer, J., were of the opinion that
the petition should be granted.
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FRANK GONSALVES, JR., et al., Respondents, v. FRANK
W. HODGSON et al., Appellants.
[1a, 1b] Trusts-Existence of Trust or Fiduciary Relationship.No trust or fiduciary relationship is created by or arises out
of the dealings of the parties to a contract to construct a ship
in a workmanlike manner in dependence on the special skill
and knowledge of one of the builders, payment to be made in
installments as construction progresses, where the parties engage in a course of arms-length dealing throughout, and the
buyers retain supervisory rights of control on all phases of
construction. (Civ. Code, §§ 2216, 2217, 2221.)
[2] !d.-Property Subject to Trust.-The special knowledge or
skill which a man possesses is not property which may be held
in trust; it can be subject only to a contractual obligation.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Trusts, § 18; [2] Trusts, § 13; [3]
Contracts, § 213; [4] Shipping, § 31; [5] Fraud, § 87; [6] Fraud,
§ 5.

